This is the first of three posts on potential Congressional action to tighten the screws on Iran and Iran’s network of proxies and supporters.
In the aftermath of the Iran-backed Hamas attack on Israel on October 7, there have been more than 100 bills introduced in Congress aimed at curtailing Iranian oil sales, rescinding the license that allowed the transfer of $6 billion held for Iran in South Korea to Qatar, ending waivers for Iranian sanctions violations and the like. Some of this legislation may pass. But many of the bills, while an answer to the demand that Congress “do something,” don’t actually achieve the necessary goals. There are several imperatives for Congress, and a couple of critical action items that will actually force the reimposition of critical elements of the so-called maximum pressure campaign on Iran.
IRAN AMENDMENTS: Both of these suggested changes relate to the main problem of Iran sanctions. It’s not loopholes, it’s not insufficient authorities. It’s not licenses and waivers. It’s enforcement, plain and simple. These changes can be made either through free-standing legislation or via amendments to existing laws.
Two existing laws provide models for what should be done to curb circumvention of the economic sanctions currently in place against Iran:
- The Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 (now known as the Iran, North Korea and Syria Nonproliferation Act, or “INKSNA”). This law was enacted in 2000 in response to a similar problem of non-enforcement of sanctions against entities that were trading with Iran in items relating to weapons of mass destruction. As is happening today with respect to the petroleum-related sanctions on Iran, the Executive Branch had fallen into the habit of studying potential sanctions violations to death—in effect, looking the other way while deliberating (or pretending to deliberate) over whether to impose sanctions in such cases. The thrust of the Iran Nonproliferation Act was to reverse the presumption from not imposing sanctions in such cases to imposing sanctions unless the President could explain why sanctions should not be imposed. Specifically, the law required (and continues to require today) that the President report to Congress every six months on every instance in which the Executive branch is in possession of “credible information” that a violation of US nonproliferation sanctions may have occurred. The law then requires the President to either impose sanctions in response to each case identified in the presidential report, or to provide a justification to Congress for not imposing sanctions.
- The Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act of 2017 (“CAATSA”). The Russia-related title of this law strengthened US sanctions on Russia, and then included a provision entitled the “Russia Sanctions Review Act” that prohibited the President to terminate, waive, or issue a license “that significantly alters United States’ foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation” without first notifying Congress of his intention to take that action, and affording Congress 30 days in which to potentially disapprove of the proposed action under expedited procedures for consideration a resolution of disapproval in both chambers of Congress.
Drawing on these two examples in current law, Congress could develop legislation to ensure (1) vigorous enforcement of existing economic sanctions on Iran, and (2) effective congressional oversight of and involvement in any future decision to relax sanctions on Iran.
Until Congress stops the White House from ignoring US law on Iran, there will be no end to the inflow of cash to the Islamic Republic.