Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas is one of the best-established Iraqi volunteer militias to fight in Iranian and Assad regime service in the Syrian Civil War and in anti-U.S. and anti-Israel armed actions.

Name: Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas (the Abbas Brigade, or LAFA) (named after al-Abbas bin Ali, one of Ali’s sons and a grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, who was killed in the Battle of Karbala in 680).

Type of movement: 

• Fasail, (armed group) whose activities predominantly revolve around kinetic military operations, such as bombings, rocket attacks, and ground assaults with the overarching goal of providing military assistance to the Assad regime. They are primarily dedicated to safeguarding Shia religious shrines in Syria and they operate in accordance with directives from Iran and Syria regarding their relocation and support for the Syrian Army, which includes occasional domestic counter-U.S. operations.

History:

• Formed in late 2012, the primary aim of the Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas was to safeguard and defend significant Shia religious sites in Syria, particularly the Sayyidah Zaynab Mosque, against potential desecration and harm during the turbulent period of the Syrian civil war.
• The group adheres to a radical jihadist ideology within the framework of Twelver Shia Islam. Its members are committed to advancing their religious and political objectives through militant means, emphasizing the significance of the Twelver Shia tradition in their operations.
• The group gained prominence in response to the widespread desecration and destruction of Shia shrines, cultural heritage sites, and places of worship by Syrian rebel factions during late 2011 and early 2012. This prompted the group to take action and collaborate with the Syrian Army to protect these sites, contributing to its rise as a significant militant force.
• Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas consists of a diverse membership base, including local Shia individuals from Damascus, Shia Iraqi refugees residing in Damascus, and foreign Shia volunteers, with a notable concentration of volunteers from Iraq. 
• While its operations extend beyond, the group’s primary operational theater is centered around the capital city of Damascus. It has actively participated in conflicts in this region, safeguarding both religious sites and government interests. They have fought in Aleppo before on multiple occasions.
• In May and June of 2013, reports surfaced regarding internal divisions and violence within the brigade. These conflicts stemmed from financial disputes and leadership disagreements, ultimately resulting in the formation of a separate brigade by non-Syrian members.
• On May 19, 2014, fighters associated with the Nour al-Din al-Zanki Brigade, a Sunni Islamist Syrian rebel group, overran the regional headquarters of Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas in Aleppo. 
• In response to the significant gains made by ISIS in Iraq in mid-2014, many of the group's Iraqi members returned to Iraq to support the Iraqi government in its efforts to counter ISIS expansion.
• Between 2014 and 2018, the group committed massacres against Sunni populations throughout Syria, mainly in Khalidiya and Baba Amr neighborhoods in Homs, the al-Bayda in Baniyas, as well as in Daraya and Eastern Ghouta.
• Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas played an active role in the 2018 Southern Syria offensive, aligning its forces with Syrian Army troops. This engagement demonstrated the group's ongoing commitment to supporting the Syrian government in various military campaigns.
• In November 2021, Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas forces that were stationed in the Al-Quriah Badia attacked U.S. and coalition forces with rockets at the Omar oil field in the eastern Deir al-Zour area, leading to the injury of 4 U.S. soldiers.
• In September 2022, a military convoy of Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas, consisting of 15 vehicles loaded with personnel, arrived from the outskirts of Damascus, to reinforce its positions in the eastern countryside of Aleppo, where other pro-Iranian militias are stationed, in particular, the Afghan Liwa Fatimeyoun.
• On November 10, 2023, Liwa Abu al-Fadhal al-Abbas strategically relocated from Damascus to Al-Mayadin in the Deir al-Zour region. This movement involved fully-equipped patrols, including military vehicles equipped with anti-aircraft artillery. Concurrently, additional Iranian-supported militia units have been observed redeploying near the vicinity of the electricity company adjacent to the Al-Qalaa ice factory in Al-Mayadin. These units are reportedly armed with rocket launchers and field artillery, ostensibly as a tactical measure to counteract the presence of U.S. forces in the region.

Objective:

• The overall objective of Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas is to protect and defend Shia religious sites, particularly the Sayyidah Zaynab Mosque, and advance the doctrine of Twelver Shia Islam within Syria in the Iranian revolutionary and expansionist fashion. Additionally, the group seeks to counter the desecration of Shia shrines and holy sites by opposing factions during the Syrian civil war. Its operations primarily focus on safeguarding these sites and contributing to the broader objectives of the Syrian government in areas where it is active, especially in and around Damascus.

Chain of command:

• Maher Ajeeb Jaza (Abu Ajeeb): Appointed directly by Iranian authorities to lead the group, hails from the village of Nabil, which is predominantly Shia and is close to Aleppo. It was reported that in 2019, Syrian military intelligence apprehended Abu Ajeeb at his residence in proximity to the Sayyida Zainab shrine neighborhood in Damascus, citing his alleged involvement in the Damascus bombings during that period. The report further asserted that the arrest was executed in accordance with Russian interests, aimed at dismantling roadblocks established in Damascus at the behest of Abu Ajeeb's brigade.
• Iran: Members receive a 45-day training course in Iran where they learn how to use weapons such as rocket launchers, Kalashnikovs, sniper rifles or rocket-propelled grenades. The group is under the supervision of commanders from the IRGC Quds Force and has extensively supported the brigade with weapons and has even facilitated the mobilization of Iraqi recruits and heavily oversees the overall recruiting process of the group.
• Syria: The volunteers have to undergo military training in a training center near the Sayyidah Zaynab shrine in Damascus. The command is led by Syrian Shabiha loyalists from Assad’s Alawite clan. Members who join the group also have to join the Syrian Army and fight for Assad before fighting for Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas. The Syrian government pays each fighter 75,000 Syrian pounds, and gives them rewards, food, and cigarettes.
• Lebanese Hezbollah: The group receives Hezbollah training in Lebanon and Hezbollah advisors and commanders oversee the integration of these newly-trained fighters into their newly-assigned positions through Syria. Hezbollah also plays a massive role in recruiting new personnel for the group and the transferring of troops of other militias to and out of Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas.

Affiliate relationships:

• Sadrist movement in Iraq: In an October 2012 interview, an anonymous militiaman disclosed that the Sadr Movement had dispatched approximately 200 Iraqi recruits to join Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas. These recruits were primarily drawn from factions that had splintered from the mainstream Sadrist movement, led by Moqtada al-Sadr. The Sadr Movement also operates a recruitment committee within Iraq to facilitate the enlistment of Iraqi volunteers into Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas for their future Syria deployments. Notably, convoys of purported pilgrims were repurposed to transport fighters and military resources to Syria. In October 2012, a recruitment committee in Diyala Province run by a jihadist/insurgent coalition dominated by al-Qaeda in Iraq claimed the Sadrist movement deployed 70 fighters to Syria to join Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas.
• Asaib Ahl al-Haq and Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq: The involvement of these groups is substantiated by martyrdom statements, reports of funerals for Iraqi fighters killed in Syria, and accounts disseminated on pro-militia websites. Visual representations of martyrs often prominently display the emblems associated with their respective groups. While the precise distribution of affiliations among Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas fighters remains unclear, a commemorative video honoring deceased fighters purported to display each individual's group affiliation.
• Badr Organization: In March 2014, an unnamed official within the Badr Organization asserted that Shia militias, mainly Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas, were acquiring "new and advanced" heavy weaponry from the Badr Organization in anticipation of potential escalations in the Syrian conflict. 
• Aleppo Defenders Legion: In 2018, the engineering corps of Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas, in cooperation with members of the Aleppo Defenders Legion, undertook a joint operation in the Salah al-Din al-Hashkal neighborhood of Aleppo. This initiative focused on the careful removal of unexploded ordnance and other explosive remnants of war left by armed factions in the area. 
• Brigade of Zaynab’s Protector and Zulfiqar Brigade: Shared membership can be inferred from photographs disseminated online through pro-brigade websites, predominantly on platforms such as Facebook.
• Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein: The operational activities of this Shia brigade in Syria have shown significant overlap with those of Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas.

Subordinate relationships: 

• Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas’ subordinate military units include the Ali Akbar Brigade, Brigade of the Awaited One, al-Qasim Brigade, Brigade of Malik al-Ashtar, and Ahmad Kayara Brigade.
• The group’s points of rally and regional headquarters are spread around many areas in Syria. In each village, the people of that village form the ranks and command of their deployed units. That is done with the aim of recruiting relatives and to encourage more local acquaintances in joining the group.
• Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas has deployed personnel in the vicinity of the al-Rahba castle in Homs, the Al-Aalaf Center near Al-Mayadin Bridge in Deir Ez-zor, several points in the village of Al-Taybeh in Homs, a huge regional HQ at Ibn Aswad on the outskirts of the village of Makhan in Deir al-Zour checkpoints near the sanctuary of Ain Ali in the Al-Quriah Badia near Al-Mayadin, and checkpoints near Al-Asharah cemeteries in the depth of the Deir al-Zour desert.
• The Syrian opposition media reported on the formation of a sub-group of Liwa Abu al-Fadl al-Abbas, known as Adnan al-Bass or al-Zuzu (perhaps named after a martyr), with the objective of covertly establishing a pro-Iranian influence within territories controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). The group also maintains multiple units alongside the other side of the Euphrates river opposite to SDF-controlled areas.
• The Field Women’s Battalion: led by Liwa Abu Fadl al-Abbas in Albu Kamal, Deir al-Zour since August 2022, is a female-only unit performing agricultural work and community services for about $100 monthly. They also manage health care and educational facilities like the Khatwa kindergarten. Their goals are to blend into Syrian society for intelligence gathering and to promote Shia ideology, focusing on the 'holy defense' concept within the Axis of Resistance. Women are preferred for their perceived reliability and ability to convey Shia values.
• The group maintains a Twitter page with 424 followers that was last active in 2015, a YouTube page with 140 subscribers that was last active in 2013, and a private Facebook page with 6 members.