Elements of an Eventual Russia-Ukraine Armistice and the Prospect for Regional Stability in Europe • Stimson Center - Stimson Center

The prospects for peace between Russia and Ukraine are dim. The violence seems as if it might grind on forever. Russia’s September 2022 annexation of Ukrainian territory, much of which the Russian military does not even control, seems almost calculated to ensure that no negotiation can succeed. Ukraine has accordingly turned its back on the offer made early in the war to pursue neutrality and instead requested a fast-track NATO membership, a long-standing Russian red line, making it more difficult to conceive of any compromise that could satisfy both sides.

But the war in Ukraine will end. Military victory remains a possibility, but the challenges both sides have faced with offensive operations imply that the war will probably end through some sort of negotiation. Any agreements that emerge from those talks could have, for better or for worse, significant implications for the regional order in Europe. It is therefore also important to consider how various parties might build on negotiations over settling the current war to stabilize the regional order.

Accordingly, the first section of this paper looks at the elements of a conceivable Russia-Ukraine armistice. The second section explores the parallel or follow-on agreements to that armistice that would facilitate a long-lasting cessation of violence. The third section then looks into follow-on efforts to strengthen the regional order.

At the moment, neither a settlement of the war nor a mutually acceptable revision of the regional order looks remotely likely. The purpose of this exercise is not to predict or even advocate for these specific outcomes. It is rather to describe the plausible elements of an armistice and an improved regional order linked to it. The path toward such an outcome remains extremely uncertain, but it is nonetheless important to have a sense of the least-worst, yet still plausible destination.

Elements of a Russia-Ukraine Armistice

At this stage in the conflict, when so much remains uncertain, it is impossible to anticipate the precise details of a negotiated end of the Russia-Ukraine war. But we can outline what the elements of a realistic outcome are, considering the current circumstances, and we can describe what a likely compromise might be in the sense that it reflects the interests of all the parties while fully satisfying none of them.

The first stage of a negotiation would be focused on reducing if not ending the violence. To be durable, it could include some or all of the four following elements:

A cessation of hostilities agreement
Disengagement of forces and withdrawal of fires and missile systems from the line of contact
A contact group to monitor compliance and provide a forum for discussing ongoing concerns
A third-party monitoring mission

For the monitoring mission, a true peacekeeping force would be ideal, but it is unlikely given the parties’ capabilities and distrust of most plausible peacekeepers. A peacekeeping force is further rendered impractical by the length of the line of contact. Including the Belarus-Ukraine border, the front line, and the undisputed Russia-Ukraine border, the total conflict line is close to 2000 kilometers long. Tens of thousands of forces would be needed to cover such a distance.

An unarmed, purely monitoring mission would likely be too reminiscent of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission (responsible for monitoring the Minsk Agreements), which Ukraine (and others) view as a failure.¹ An alternative model is the one Russia used in the early 1990s in the former-Soviet region: joint peacekeeping forces, through which the parties themselves police the peace. The peacekeeping force in Moldova still operates on this model.² Many also view this model as deeply problematic as it can offer opportunities for both sides to restart the conflict, or serve as a mechanism to permanently freeze it.³

A more plausible mechanism could be extensive use of unmanned sensors to monitor compliance. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission attempted small-scale use of drones, with some effect. However, technology has advanced significantly since then.

Historically, many post-conflict negotiations did not progress beyond this first stage; the Korean Armistice, a temporary measure in place since 1953, is an apt example.⁴ But, as in that case, a durable reduction in violence would nonetheless be a huge step forward.

Follow-On or Parallel Agreements to an Armistice

A peace treaty that restores bilateral relations between Russia and Ukraine is now off the table, but some of the political disputes that drove the conflict or were created by it will likely have to be addressed to ensure that even a ceasefire holds over the long term. Given the challenges of signing formal agreements with Russia (for either Ukraine or the West), any arrangements involving Moscow at this stage are likely to be informal, or come in the form of coordinated unilateral steps.

In particular, the question of Ukraine’s geopolitical status (i.e., whether it will be neutral, non-aligned or a member of a NATO) was central to the talks that led to the March 2022 Istanbul Communique.⁵ It has been central to Russian threat perceptions for decades before that. It is plausible, perhaps even likely, that Russia will continue its aggression until this issue is addressed in some way. It is equally plausible that Ukraine will require security assurances from its partners in order to agree to a ceasefire.

Currently, NATO allies and Ukraine are pursuing both Kyiv’s integration and (in theory) eventual membership in the alliance (without much of a clear pathway to that outcome), on the one hand, and bilateral security commitments that would provide significant military assistance over the long term, on the other. This dual-pronged approach could lead to one of three outcomes:

Bucharest Plus: Ukraine is forever told that it “will become” a member of the alliance, as allies pledged in the 2008 Bucharest summit communique, but never actually does join.⁶ In the meantime, it would have bilateral security assistance commitments.
West Germany Model: Ukraine gets security assistance commitments and, after a ceasefire stabilizes, it becomes a member of NATO on the “West German” model.⁷ When the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) became a member of the alliance, allies extended the writ of Article 5 only to the inner-German border and made clear that they would not come to Bonn’s assistance if it were to start a war with East Germany, even though they recognized the FRG as the only legitimate government.⁸ Bonn was forced to explicitly undertake “never to have recourse to force to achieve the reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries.”⁹ For Ukraine, that model would entail Article 5 extending to the line of contact only and a similar message that allies will not support any offensive action even to retake Ukraine’s sovereign territory.
West Germany + Norway Model: Norway was a frontline state in the Cold War, one of two allies to share a land border with the Soviet Union. To avoid escalatory dynamics with its superpower neighbor, it adopted voluntary self-restraint measures, forswearing the stationing of nuclear weapons on its territory, the permanent basing of foreign forces, and military exercises close to the Soviet border.¹⁰ For Ukraine, this option would entail membership on the West German model with similar self-restraint measures, along with bilateral security assistance commitments.

If Ukraine decides to return to non-alignment, two models are possible:

Istanbul Communique Model: Ukraine formally adopts neutrality and commits not to host foreign forces or exercises involving foreign forces. Kyiv gets security guarantees from a number of countries (including the United States, Germany, and Poland, but also Russia) that would entail a pledge to come to Ukraine’s assistance if it is attacked in the future, similar to Article 5. It also would receive bilateral security assistance commitments from Western countries. This is the model described in the Istanbul communique.¹¹
Israel Model: Ukraine commits to explicit non-alignment but receives security assistance commitments (not security guarantees). This is effectively the “Israel Model” — the United States has no formal treaty obligations to Israel but does provide extensive military assistance.¹²

The details of Ukraine’s future security arrangements remain hotly debated and involve critical issues of sovereignty for Ukraine. But for the purposes of this effort, the key question is whether a given geopolitical status promotes a sustainable end to the war. The U.S. and allied interest once the fighting ends is to ensure it does not begin again. The objective is thus not only to ensure the security of Ukraine but rather to do so in a way that minimizes the chance of the war recurring.

With that goal in mind, the West’s approach to Ukraine’s geopolitical status should look to both deter Russia from attacking Ukraine again after the ceasefire and to create incentives for Russia to comply with the ceasefire.

The first two models might well create incentives for Russia to violate a ceasefire if agreed or never agree to one in the first place. If Moscow is convinced that an end to the hostilities would ease Ukraine’s caveat-free entry into NATO, it has good reason to keep the war going or break any truce. The West Germany + Norway Model might be acceptable to Russia, but it is likely that the Kremlin would want to ensure that the Western assistance does not enable Ukrainian offensive operations to retake occupied territory. Generally speaking, Russia is less likely to attack again if the process of devising these guarantees involves consultations with the Russian government, or at least seeks implicit Russian consent.

The final two options would provide the most incentives for Russia to comply with the ceasefire. But, of course, they might be unacceptable to Ukraine.

A second follow-on or parallel agreement will need to address Ukraine’s postwar reconstruction. Much of this money will inevitably come from Ukraine’s international partners. But politically it is likely that Kyiv will demand that Moscow bear the financial responsibility for its crimes. Direct restitution would likely be impossible for Russia, under Putin or any plausible successor, to accept. However, the fund might potentially use Russia’s frozen central bank reserves—since Moscow has likely given up hope of ever getting these funds back, it might be possible to get Russian consent to use them for reconstruction in Ukraine so long as doing so would end further demands for compensation.

Ukraine will want some agreed method for accountability for war crimes. The International Criminal Court has already taken up some cases, which implies that Russia and Ukraine will need to find some agreed method of accountability, or the international courts will drive forward and potentially impose penalties that could make it more difficult to for the parties to settle the disputes themselves.¹³

Finally, some conditional, partial Western sanctions relief for Russia might be on the table as well. Any sanctions relief would likely be linked to Russian compliance with the ceasefire, and there would probably be “snapback” clauses for reimposition of sanctions in case of non-compliance, as there were with the Iran Nuclear Deal (the so-called Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action).¹⁴

Ukraine’s EU membership process is proceeding already. But it would be important for Russia to reaffirm that it will not undermine that process, as it did in the Istanbul Communique.¹⁵ This could come in the form of a unilateral Russian statement.

Notably, none of these various negotiations would resolve in any way the issue of de jure borders or de facto territorial control. Even if the parties reached some sort of agreement on the above issues, they would essentially agree to disagree on quite central issues of borders and control over disputed territories. The location of the line of control in the ceasefire will likely be determined at the time the cessation of hostilities is agreed, perhaps with some minor adjustments to enhance defensibility. The ceasefire lines would thus determine de facto territorial control. The bilateral territorial dispute would thus remain unresolved and would remain a permanent potential casus belli for both sides, creating the constant threat of renewed fighting.

The long-term “theory of victory” for both sides would probably be the German reunification model: that over time the attractiveness of one side will cause the people on the other to vote with their feet or demand an end to division, thus creating a political opening for a political settlement on the first side’s terms, as it did during German reunification. Such a process can take decades, as it did in the German case, or, as in the case of the Korean peninsula, can go on indefinitely. But it provides a narrative that leaders can use to demonstrate commitment to the cause of territorial reconquest without resorting to renewed violence to achieve it.

From a Russia-Ukraine Armistice to a Stable Regional Order

The above agreements do not constitute a final settlement – they only seek a durable cessation of hostilities. Disputes between Russia and Ukraine and between Russia and the West will certainly persist, probably indefinitely. For that reason, it might be useful to consider how the armistice and follow-on agreements might be built upon to strengthen the broader regional order in Europe and Eurasia. The purpose of that effort would be to find new, more effective arrangements for avoiding future conflict.

This goal reflects an understanding that the war itself grew out of disputes among Russia, the West, and the countries in between over the regional order. The Ukraine war is the most acute manifestation of long-running disagreements relating to that order. For a durable settlement in the postwar era, those differences over the regional order must be managed. Otherwise, conflict is likely to break out again in Ukraine or other states that border Russia at some point in the future. In other words, even a definitive end to the hot phase of the Russia-Ukraine war is not going to bring stability unless there are broader efforts to strengthen the regional order.

The purpose of the regional order in this sense is to provide mechanisms and forums to manage differences and avoid conflict, not to create any sort of convergence between systems or resolve political disputes. Its objective is stability, not reconciliation or common security —let alone a shared security architecture, as had been the aspiration in the 1990s and even beyond.

Several elements of a negotiated end to the Russia-Ukraine war might have broader implications for the regional order. They include:

Status neutrality and compartmentalization of territorial disputes: Parties to conflicts involving disputed borders and status of territory tend to use every possible avenue to further their respective claims. To succeed even in part, the Russia-Ukraine war talks will have to develop habits and mechanisms for compartmentalization of these disputes: demonstrations that the parties can agree on discrete issues without jeopardizing their positions on matters of international law. These habits and mechanisms could allow the parties to other long-running status disputes to similarly find interim agreements that can avoid violence and make life better for people on the ground.
New security arrangements for nonaligned states: The effort to provide Ukraine with security guarantees has sparked a very fertile debate over appropriate security commitments to other nonaligned states in the region. If Ukraine ends up with a new type of security arrangement that works (in that it avoids war recurrence), it might represent a model that can be used for other nonaligned regional states. Even if Ukraine ends up with entirely bespoke security guarantees, the arrangements might contain some elements that would be applicable to other regional states. For example, under the so-called Israel Model, non-aligned states would continue to have the right to arm, accept weapons and training from outside parties, as well as to conclude economic agreements with the EU and other partners, in part as a deterrent against future aggression. But they would not be candidates for NATO or CSTO membership, nor would they allow foreign forces on their soil or conduct large exercises with foreign partners.
A Regional Consultation Mechanism: The contact group established for the Russia-Ukraine war armistice could eventually evolve into a regional consultation mechanism. It would serve the roles of providing a forum for dialogue, ensuring consultations in the event of crises, and guaranteeing transparency among major powers and key nonaligned regional states. It would allow all countries involved to surface issues of concern and all interested parties would commit to taking part in the discussions. Prior to the 2022 Ukraine crisis, there was a lack of discussion among the major powers on regional issues and no mechanism to allow for semi-formal crisis consultations. Such consultations, of course, are no guarantee of peace but they do reduce the likelihood of unnecessary wars.

Additionally, two other sets of issues would need to be addressed in this context:

NATO-Russia confidence and security building measures (CSBMs)/conventional arms control arrangements. European regional arms control measures involving NATO and Russia have played a historic role in ensuring the security of the continent and the broader Euro-Atlantic region during both the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. Such measures included the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty, and the Open Skies Treaty. Today, all these treaty regimes are either terminally ill or already dead. If even a temporary Ukraine armistice is agreed upon, NATO member-states and Russia (plus possibly Belarus) would benefit from using the opportunity to explore a new regional arms control regime designed to minimize the chances of an inadvertent conflict through misperception or miscalculation, and to complicate rapid escalation of such a conflict were it to begin. Such a regime should be designed for the circumstances of the new NATO-Russia confrontation. Arms control cannot transform that confrontation. But it can help mitigate the tensions that could cause it to go “hot.” The specific arms control arrangements negotiated for Russia and Ukraine in the context of a durable armistice of that conflict might serve as a starting point for imagining a broader arms control regime fit for current purposes. They might include efforts along three lines: limiting military activities and exercises in strategically sensitive locations, restrictions on deployments of long-range strike assets that put at risk sensitive areas, and transparency agreements that provide information sharing about the disposition and movements of forces in agreed areas.¹⁶
Restoration of some connectivity between Russia and the West. Partial restoration of connectivity between Russia and the West including on flights, visas, and broader economic exchanges would likely need to be part of a stabilization process.

It would therefore be desirable to begin a broader dialogue on regional issues immediately following or in parallel to an end to the fighting in Ukraine. There is no going back to normal relations with Russia after its wanton violation of Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity. But it is still possible to conceive of managing the competition with Russia and working out regional arrangements that will reduce the possibility of future conflicts and contribute to regional and global stability. A fully inclusive order is no longer plausible, but various norms, dialogue formats, and other arrangements could conceivably be agreed on a piecemeal basis. Together, such agreements could lay the foundation of long-term regional stability.

About the Authors

Samuel Charap is a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation. His research interests include the foreign policies of Russia and the former Soviet states; European and Eurasian regional security; and U.S.-Russia deterrence, strategic stability, and arms control. Twitter: https://www.twitter.com/scharap.

Jeremy Shapiro is the research director of the European Council on Foreign Relations. His areas of focus include US foreign policy and transatlantic relations. Twitter: https://twitter.com/JyShapiro

Notes

1
“OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (Closed).” n.d. OSCE Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe. Accessed December 7, 2023. https://www.osce.org/special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine-closed ; “Protocol on the Results of Consultations of the Trilateral Contact Group (Minsk Agreement) | UN Peacemaker.” n.d. Accessed December 7, 2023. https://peacemaker.un.org/UA-ceasefire-2014 ; Andreas Umland. 2021. “Achievements and Limitations of the OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine.” Utrikespolitiska Institutet. March 2021. https://www.ui.se/forskning/centrum-for-osteuropastudier/sceeus-report/no-3-achievements-and-limitations-of-the-osces-special-monitoring-mission-to-ukraine/.
2
“TRANSDNIESTRIAN CONFLICT: Origins and Main Issues.” n.d. OSCE. Accessed December 8, 2023. https://2001-2009.state.gov/documents/organization/13611.pdf
3
Vladimir Socor. n.d. “Twenty Years of Russian ‘Peacekeeping’ in Moldova.” The Jamestown Foundation. Accessed December 7, 2023. https://jamestown.org/program/twenty-years-of-russian-peacekeeping-in-moldova/.
4
Bong-geun Jun. 2023. “70 Years After the Armistice, the Korean Peninsula Still Struggles for Peace.” United States Institute of Peace. September 11, 2023. https://www.usip.org/publications/2023/09/70-years-after-armistice-korean-peninsula-still-struggles-peace.
5
Rustamova, Farida. 2022. “Ukraine’s 10-Point Plan.” Substack newsletter. Faridaily (blog). March 29, 2022. https://faridaily.substack.com/p/ukraines-10-point-plan.
6
NATO. 2022. “Bucharest Summit Declaration Issued by NATO Heads of State and Government (2008).” NATO. July 5, 2022. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_8443.html.
7
Erlanger, Steven. 2023. “If a Divided Germany Could Enter NATO, Why Not Ukraine?” The New York Times, May 26, 2023, sec. World. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/05/26/world/europe/ukraine-nato-germany.html.
8
“Final Act of the London Conference.” 1954. NATO Archives. October 3, 1954. https://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/appendices/1b.htm.
9
1954. NATO Archives. October 3, 1954.
10
NATO. n.d. “Norway and NATO – 1949.” NATO Declassified. Accessed December 7, 2023. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_162353.htm ; Niels J. Haagerup and Nils Örvik. n.d. “The Scandinavian Members of Nato: The Adelphi Papers: Vol 5, No 23.” Taylor & Francis Online. Accessed December 7, 2023. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/05679326508448035.
11
Rustamova, 2022. n.d.; Charap, Samuel. 2022. “Ukraine’s Best Chance for Peace.” Foreign Affairs, June 1, 2022. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-06-01/ukraines-best-chance-peace.
12
Fareed Zakaria. n.d. “CNN.Com – Transcripts.” CNN Transcripts. Accessed December 7, 2023. https://transcripts.cnn.com/show/fzgps/date/2023-07-09/segment/01.
13
“Ukraine | International Criminal Court.” 2022. January 2022. https://www.icc-cpi.int/situations/ukraine.
14
“Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.” EEAS, July 14, 2015. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/joint-comprehensive-plan-action_en.
15
Rustamova, Farida. 2022. “Ukraine’s 10-Point Plan.” Substack newsletter. Faridaily (blog). March 29, 2022. https://faridaily.substack.com/p/ukraines-10-point-plan.
16
Charap, Samuel, Alice Lynch, John J. Drennan, Dara Massicot, and Giacomo Persi Paoli. 2020. “A New Approach to Conventional Arms Control in Europe: Addressing the Security Challenges of the 21st Century.” RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR4346.html.

Elements of a Russia-Ukraine Armistice

Follow-On or Parallel Agreements to an Armistice

From a Russia-Ukraine Armistice to a Stable Regional Order

About the Authors

Notes

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