Introduction

The October 7 terrorist attack organized by Hamas against Israel led to the escalation of the confrontations in the Gaza Strip, against an already sensitive and tense background for decades. On the other hand, the reopening of large-scale confrontations in the Gaza Strip presses the sensitive point on the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, reiterated as a security objective for the Middle East region. Some of the Gulf States, such as the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Oman, highlighted their role as mediators in order to prevent the escalation of tensions in the East. Also, the three states play a significant role in regional peacekeeping organizations such as the League of Arab States and the Council of Gulf States, and the need to find a permanent solution has been reaffirmed within these regional pillars. However, each of the three states has different views on how to implement a sustainable solution in the Israel-Palestine peace process.

Context

In order to deepen the mechanisms and instruments used in order to de-escalate conflicts and ensure the security of the region, but also of the Persian Gulf, understood as a security sub-system, it is important to specify the attempts to normalize Israel, but also the relations with Palestine that the states of the Gulf developed over time.

Saudi Arabia

Although supportive of the Palestinian cause, Saudi Arabia’s relations with Israel gradually eased since 2005, being on the verge of normalization in 2023, until the beginning of Israel’s conflict with Hamas. However, the Israel-Hamas conflict has caused a freeze on Saudi Arabia-Israel normalization steps since early 2023, with progress made with US help.

In retrospect, if the thawing of relations between the two states was perceived more in the economic sense until the Arab Spring, after the turning point of the Arab Spring, Israel perceived Saudi Arabia as a promoter of stability in the region. Also, Saudi Arabia’s role as a founding member of the League of Arab States was a weighty factor in the strategic decision, causing other Arab states to rethink their orientation regarding the dynamic with Israel, depending on Saudi Arabia’s approach. Since 2014, during the previous conflict in Gaza, Saudi Arabia has engaged in talks with Israel in a way that would facilitate the negotiation of the peace process. Favorable signs also existed in 2001, when Saudi Arabia mediated to minimize anti-Semitic views within Arab societies, but also in 2018, when Israel reaffirmed Saudi Arabia’s role in ensuring the stability of the region.

Regarding the Palestinian cause, Saudi Arabia has declared itself supportive since 1948, after the Arab-Palestinian war, following a period of warming relations under the reign of King Faisal bin Abdulaziz Al Saud. However, after the involvement of the Palestinian Authority in the invasion of Kuwait in 1991, a political and cultural ally of Saudi Arabia, relations suffered a flattening, continuing to oscillate until 2023. Recent developments show that since August, the Saudi government has appointed its first non-resident ambassador to represent relations with Palestine.

 United Arab Emirates

After decades of strained relations, UAE-Israel normalization was subtly initiated unofficially in 2010, with Israel opening its first diplomatic mission in Abu Dhabi in 2015. The moment of initializing diplomatic relations between the two states was constituted by the Abrahamic Agreements in 2020, signed by the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco and brokered by the USA. The step taken by Bahrain and the UAE as states in the Gulf area was an advanced signal in the region regarding the rethinking of relations with Israel. The completion of the normalization process materialized with the opening of both embassies in 2021.

On the other hand, the relations between the UAE and the Palestinian territories are characterized by their economic and political nature. Although, like any other Muslim state, the United Arab Emirates supports the independence of the Palestinian territories, normalization with Israel has led to a cooling of relations with the Palestinian territories. Also, Bahrain’s relations with the Palestinian Authority exist through the prism of the economic and political sides, separating from the moment of formalizing relations with Israel. However, Bahrain unequivocally affirms support for the independence of the Palestinian territories.

Oman

Oman is perhaps the only state in the Persian Gulf recognized for the principles of neutrality that it applies in the regional environment. For example, by asserting itself as a state that supports the Palestinian cause, Oman’s approach to Israel proves to be balanced. Relations with Israel were maintained on an unofficial level; however, with a view to full normalization, Oman made the completion of procedures conditional on the recognition of the State of Palestine by Israel. Recognized as a moderate Islamic state like the United Arab Emirates, Oman stood out by respecting the right of other states like Egypt to normalize ties with Israel without imposing sanctions, but also to maintain dialogue with Israeli representatives without closing the door to the Palestinians.

The same perspective regarding the peace-making process but different approaches

The classic solution to the Israeli-Palestinian dilemma is found in the Arab Peace Initiative of 2002, which stipulates the following requirements: Requests Israel to reconsider its policies and declare peace, with the consequence of a full Israeli withdrawal from all the territories occupied since 1967, including the Syrian Golan Heights to the lines of June 4, 1967, as well as the remaining occupied Lebanese territories in the south of Lebanon, and a just solution to the Palestinian refugee problem to be agreed upon in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194. In addition, it requires the acceptance of the establishment of a sovereign independent Palestinian state on the Palestinian territories occupied since June 4, 1967, in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, with East Jerusalem as its capital. This initiative, proposed by Saudi Arabia, was accepted by the Arab League states at the Beirut Summit as the most appropriate to resolve the Israel-Palestine conflict. However, with the signing of the 2020 Abraham Accords by the UAE and Bahrain, it was believed that following this step, Israel would no longer be motivated to implement the 2002 Initiative.

However, the Arab Emirates came with a readjustment of the perspective after the conclusion of the Abrahamic agreements, which would mediate between the two camps by extending humanitarian aid to the Palestinians, increasing the degree of inclusion of the Palestinian communities in the UAE, and developing new economic channels for the Palestinians. The Emirates has also maintained its firm position that normalizing relations with Israel does not preclude support for the Palestinians. The UAE’s approach reflects the gradual integration of an accessible and much more flexible format towards a realistic approach to peace goals. With a much more reserved approach, Oman approaches the same foreign policy in the sense that it does not rule out unofficial relations with Israel but subjects full normalization to the conditions of recognition of Palestine.

On the other hand, Oman avoided imposing a deadline on the recognition of Palestine’s independence by Israel, demonstrating flexibility in its approach. Saudi Arabia, instead, exhibits a more conservative approach to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Moreover, the UAE-Saudi Arabia differences, for example, can be seen regarding the inclination to incorporate elements of innovation and novelty that are accepted and implemented much more easily by the Emirati society compared to the Saudi one.

Thus, the foreign policies of the two states tend to reflect the trends of the regional security environment. For example, in the case of Saudi Arabia, the normalization agreement with Iran resulted in the facilitation of Syria’s readmission to the Arab League, but on the other hand, it considerably delayed the completion of normalization with Israel. The interdependence of the economic, energy, and environmental security sectors, as well as the prevention of an arms race in the Middle East, determines the reanalysis of the Israeli-Palestinian peace format. The security threats that have become much more complex, as well as the conflicting interests of the states’ political agenda, show that the terms of Israel-Palestine peace can no longer be perceived in black and white. The example of the United Arab Emirates, although criticized by some more entrenched Arab states, still highlights a balanced approach, preferable to the already sensitive context of peace terms. Moreover, as a political solution has been delayed for decades, the peace terms should include concessions from both sides that are sufficiently sustainable to prevent a resurgence of conflict.

Conclusions

Analyzing the perspectives of the three Gulf states, we observe the same objectives, but translated in different shades by the three states as a result of foreign policy, cultural elements, and historical affinities. But while it seems like an old dilemma, what is at stake with the outbreak of the Israel-Hamas conflict? Freezing the normalization process between Saudi Arabia and Israel reconfiguring the security architecture not only of relations in the Gulf but also of the Middle East. The need to increase the involvement of the Arab states to mediate the peace process to prevent an arms race Rethinking the Arab peace initiative, as well as the parameters, in accordance with the current needs of the security environment An almost rhetorical question arises, reviewing the tumultuous oscillations of the Israel-Palestine relationship: will Arab states succeed in actively engaging to provide a sustainable solution to prevent the escalation or expansion of the conflict, considering that tensions between Israel and Palestine cause effervescence locally and regionally?

Print Friendly, PDF & Email

About the author:

Ms. Iulia-Mihaela DRĂGAN

Iulia-Mihaela DRĂGAN is a PhD candidate studying Information and National security at the National University of Defense (Carol I). Her field of expertise is the prevention of Islamic radicalization. She graduated both the National Defense College and the Home Affairs College. She also got a master's degree in "Security and Diplomacy" from the Department of International Relations and European Integration (SNSPA) and a master's degree in "European Union law" at the University of Bucharest.