Given a couple of days of Gaza-related ceasefire, muqawama leaders went back to old habits of diminishing each other and spilling their secrets, with interesting results

On November 25, 2023, the Secretary General of Kataib Hezbollah (KH), Ahmad Mohsen Faraj al-Hamidawi (aka Abu Hussein) issued a statement announcing the reduction in the Iraqi muqawama’s attacks against U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria.

Making a list, checking it twice

In his statement, Abu Hussein revealed names of the militia groups who took part in the recent campaign against U.S. troops in Iraq and Syria. He thanked “the Mujahideen brothers who participated in military jihad operations, (Ansar Allah al-Awfiya (AAA), Harakat al-Nujaba (HaN), Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada (KSS), and Kataib Hezbollah (KH) [who carried out their attacks under] the banner of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI)” (Figure 1). It is arguable that Abu Hussein is listing the factions in what he views as reverse order of significance – giving prime placement to KH and KSS, reflecting the apparent U.S. focus also, based on recent sanctions and airstrikes.

If Abu Hussein “outed” the club of militant players involved since October 17 in attacks on U.S. forces, he seemed to deliberately leave Asaib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) out of that club. This may be the case inside Iraq, where there are no indicators of AAH undertaking attacks since October 17. Yet AAH may play an important role in consolidating Iran’s influence in Syria by providing transportation and logistics services. This explains why two AAH fighters were recently killed in an Israeli airstrike in Syria and were mourned by Qais al-Khazali (Figure 2).

KH escalates, but accepts truce

Abu Hussein also pointed out the reason behind this decision. He added “The occupation's continued infringement on Iraqi sovereignty and the violation of the [Iraqi] airspace, whether by reconnaissance drones or fighter planes, or by the scandalous interference of the American ambassador in the governmental scene, requires us to change some of the rules of engagement to preserve the country and purge it from the abomination of the occupiers.” He continued “We declare the reduction of the pace of escalation of operations against the American occupation bases in the region, and to stop them against the Zionist entity until the end of the truce, or the fighting in Palestine and its borders with Lebanon”.  Abu Hussein linked this decision to the truce in Gaza.

Nujaba calls for full-throttle escalation

Abu Hussein’s statement is in sharp contrast with another statement published two days before by Akram al-Kaabi, the Secretary General of HaN who in response to the U.S. strikes against KH bases in Jurf al-Sakhar said that “it has become a duty for everyone to declare war on America and remove it, humiliated, from Iraq. There is no excuse for anyone after today…” (Figure 3).

Kaabi’s statement came at a time when it became clear a truce between Israel and Hamas is imminent, yet he called for an escalation against U.S. assets in Iraq and Syria.

Additionally, the fact that the announcement regarding the reduction in the attacks was announced by Abu Hussein and not Akram al-Kaabi is another indication of a difference within those groups had a role in attacking U.S. assets in the latest campaign. Kaabi, as the Secretary of the Iraqi Resistance Coordination Committee (al-Haya al-Tansiqiya lil-Muqawama al-Iraqiya), is usually responsible for announcing such stances.

AAH reacts to KH’s snub

AAH was quick to show its deep dissatisfaction with Abu Hussein's statement. Jawad al-Talibawi, AAH's security head responded directly to Abu Hussein's statement in a strongly-worded tweet by saying "it is strange that, despite the knowledge of the person who wrote the statement about the facts on the ground, he deliberately mentioned the names of factions and left out others, without justification or a real sense of responsibility... We hope that such statements from our brothers in jihad will not be repeated..." (Figure 4).

Previous to this row, a similar, yet more subtle argument broke out between AAH and HaN. Kaabi seems to have addressed groups such as AAH with a scolding tone when in his above statement he said, “there is no excuse for anyone after today”.  It seems that Kaabi’s reprimand didn’t sit well with Qais al-Khazali, the Secretary General of AAH. One day after Kaabi’s statement, Khazali appeared on Harakat al-Jihad wal Bina TV, al-Janub TV emphasizing the fact that the muqawama attacks in Iraq didn’t kill any U.S. soldiers (Figure 5). Khazali was, on the surface, critiquing the United States for killing Iraqi fighters in response to attacks which did not result in death among U.S. soldiers in Iraq, but he also seemed to be indirectly mocking the militias who carried out the attacks. AAH has employed this tone before in critiquing KH for performative resistance, most notably during the “Tuna and Noodles” saga in 2021, when AAH responded to KH mocking of Asaib’s non-lethal rocket attacks with scathing criticism of KH’s convoy strategy of blowing up Iraqi trucks carrying “tuna and noodles” to the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad.

What have we learned about the muqawama?

The recent hair-pulling between muqawama siblings shows that the briefest respite in operations will usually open up schisms between them. KH was showing off its discipline: ramping up attacks or pausing them, in sync with the broader Axis of Resistance. Nujaba seemed to accept this show of seniority by KH and let it pass – while underlining its unparalleled aggressiveness, if allowed free rein to attack U.S. forces. Both KH and Nujaba took swipes at AAH, casting doubt on their status as a ‘true muqawama’ faction involved in kinetic resistance activities. Qais al-Khazali has long struggled to toe the line between politician and muqawama leader, and in the current crisis he has even fallen behind Badr in terms of rhetorical vigor.

The fact that Abu Hussein, in an unusual move, chose to name the militias who participated in this military campaign shows that the old argument between various Iran-backed militias about who truly belongs to the muqawama is still very fresh. It also underlines that working within the Islamic Resistance of Iraq shared claim mechanism was taxing for the factions, who still want individual recognition for the militant work they do. The facade strategy requires a sacrifice of ego, which is not something they can keep up for very long.