Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein is one of the largest Iraqi-Syrian militia developed by the IRGC-QF to support Syrian, Iranian and Lebanese Hezbollah objectives in Syria.
Name: Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein (named after the third Shia Imam, Hussein, Ali’s second son and the Prophet Muhammad’s grandson).
Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein logo
Type of movement:
Tier 2 fasail (armed group), serves as one of Iran's primary operational arms in Syria, engaging in highly kinetic military operations that include ground offensives, strategic bombings, and precise rocket attacks in support of the Assad regime against domestic adversaries and, in support of Iranian objectives, against Israel and the U.S.
History:
Formed in 2016, this group operated under the direct supervision of the former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps - Quds Force (IRGC-QF) commander Qasem Soleimani, with the explicit aim of countering the Islamic State and reinforcing the Assad regime's hold in Syria.
While centered in Homs and Aleppo, the group extends its operational reach across Syria as necessitated by strategic objectives. The group has been active in multiple Syrian locations, including al-Moadhamiya, al-Mleha, Darayya, al-Darkhabiya, Khan al-Shih, Wadi Barada, al-Qabwan, Harasta, al-Hajar al-Aswad, Yarmouk, Deraa, Idlib, and various sectors in the eastern and western Ghoutas.
In March 2018, Qassem Soleimani and Hezbollah’s Muhammad Jaafar Qasir (Hajj Fadi) coordinated the nesting of the Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein under the Syrian army's command, but with Iranian financial and political support.
Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein received strategic armaments like surface-to-surface missiles and drones from the IRGC-QF, both for the brigade's occasional use and for protection and hidden storage.
Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein claimed a missile strike on American military installations near al-Tanf in October 2021, with aiming corrections provided by a drone overhead during the strike.
Since 2018, Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein forces have been stationed in the Golan Heights and other locations opposite Israel, and have attempted multiple rocket and drone strikes against Israel. In January 2019, a rocket attack on a ski resort in northern Israel's Hermon Mountains was initially attributed to the Quds Force; however, nearby activities of Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein indicate their probable involvement. Later in August, the emergence of drone threats near the Golan Heights led to Israel forming a specialized team to counteract these incursions. Israeli retaliatory fire has struck Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein sites in the Golan and around Homs.
In March 2023, Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein launched rocket attacks on U.S. bases in the Omar and Conoco oil fields in Deir al-Zour.
In October 2023, a significant number of the group’s members were redeployed to the Golan Heights and Southern Lebanon, with the objective of reinforcing Hezbollah's operations against Israel during the conflict with Hamas.
The brigade currently claims a strength of approximately 6,000 combatants. The group’s personnel is mainly composed of Syrians but also includes fighters from Lebanon, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Sudan, Nigeria, and Iraq. These recruits serve in non-leadership capacities, with the command structure remaining predominantly Syrian.
Objective:
Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein's primary objective is to retain the financial and political support of the the Syrian government, IRGC-QF and Lebanese Hezbollah. The force is available for military operations against any enemies of these players, foreign or domestic, including the U.S., Israel, and the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
Chain of command:
Zulfiqar Hinnawi: A Lebanese national and a Lebanese Hezbollah operative, Hinnawi was previously the regional commander of Lebanese Hezbollah in Aleppo and was in charge of the Aziz engineering unit. He worked alongside Qassem Soleimani in Aleppo in the 2016 battles there.
IRGC-QF: The Quds Force formed Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein, and has provided them with material support, including salaries, benefits, medical support, equipment and weaponry. IRGC-QF has moved this support to Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein through civilian air transportation to Damascus International Airport and maritime shipments to Latakia. Also, Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein personnel undergo training provided by IRGC-QF advisors.
Syrian regime and the 4th Division of the Syrian Arab Army: Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein is subordinate to the Syrian Army's Fourth Armored Division, commanded by Maher al-Assad, Bashar al-Assad’s brother. A section, the Death Battalion of Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein was not only established but also armed by the Fourth Armored Division of the Syrian Army.
Lebanese Hezbollah: Lebanese Hezbollah has been pivotal in the establishment of Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein in Syria, resulting in frequent public references to the brigade as "Syrian Hezbollah". Hezbollah has assumed a role akin to that of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in Syrian territories, overseeing the meticulous process of recruiting and instructing pro-Iranian militia operatives, especially Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein. A critical aspect of this process is the stringent verification of each member's absolute fidelity to the doctrine of Velayat al-Faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist).
Affiliate relationships:
Nujaba. With coordination provided by Qassem Soleimani, the Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein leadership worked closely with Hezbollah Harakat al-Nujaba units in 2016.
Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF): Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein maintains strategic associations with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq, as evidenced by mutual public endorsements. The solidarity between the two groups is further reinforced by reciprocal expressions of support on various social media platforms. Additionally, the PMF has actively collaborated with Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein in several military campaigns in Syria.
Sadr Movement: A report from the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs in 2017 identified Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein as an entity associated with the Sadr Movement in Iraq, led by the Muslim cleric Moqtada al-Sadr, and primarily active in the Damascus area. The report highlighted that the Sadr Movement, lent its support to Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein with the expressed purpose of defending sacred shrines in the Damascus region, mainly the Sayyidah Zaynab shrine. Many Sadrist families moved to Damascus during Iraq's 2006-2008 civil war.
Liwa Abu al-Fadhal al-Abbas: The operational activities of Liwa al-Imam al-Hussein and Liwa Abu al-Fadhal al-Abbas have shown significant overlap.
Subordinate relationships:
The group has an Instagram page that was last active in January 2021. It maintains a follower base of just under 700 followers.
The group also maintains a private active Facebook group with a follower base of around 3,500 members.