Western experts in conversation with Russian interlocutors report that many Russians working in the presidential administration believe that launching a war against Ukraine was a mistake. But they all say that since Russia has started the war, it must now win it. Moreover, most of the political and economic elite have no alternative but to remain loyal to the regime—the cost of voicing disagreement is unacceptably high given extreme repression (see below). The costs of exiting Russia have also grown as Russian elites have trouble finding opportunities outside the country as advantageous for them and their families as their current positions.

Although the elite remains loyal to the regime, there are different visions for Russia’s future—factions that Russian analyst Tatiana Stanovaya has labeled the “pragmatists,” who would like to shift focus away from the war and pursue concrete policy proposals, and the “hardliners,” who propose a full mobilization and more extreme policy changes to enable Russia’s wartime effort. The hardliners remain on the periphery, but a perceived weakening of Putin’s position within the system could empower this group and upset the current status quo over time.

There are also visible signs of opposition from some of the few oligarchs who have left Russia. For example, Arkady Volozh, former CEO of Yandex, denounced the war in a likely effort to have EU sanctions against him removed. Putin has lashed out more publicly against those in the elite who have left. He recently denounced Anatoly Chubais in a vicious attack, likely intended to intimidate other members of the business elite.

Finally, questions about the health of Chechen strongman and key Putin ally Ramzan Kadyrov have been circulating. In the case of his death, his tight regime would likely identify a consensus candidate to enable his clique to sustain their hold on power, perhaps under the leadership of Kadyrov’s eldest son. Nonetheless, Kadyrov’s health and stability in the North Caucasus merits watching as it could precipitate instability the Kremlin would have to navigate.

The Kremlin continues to tighten its control over the information environment, through both legislation and efforts to reign in pro-war commentators that have been critical of Moscow’s execution of the war. In June, Putin met with a group of war correspondents and bloggers, a group that has been critical in shaping politically minded Russians’ understanding of the war. Although this may be an indication of Kremlin anxiety about its ability to control the narrative, it signals its intent to reign this group in.

Prigozhin’s failed mutiny provides a good indicator of the extent of the Kremlin’s control over the information environment. Given the government’s tight control over the media, the Kremlin was able to tarnish Prigozhin’s image, present him as a traitor, and ultimately, treat the failed mutiny as a non-event. In part for these reasons, public opinion appeared unaffected by the incident.

Meanwhile, reporter Evan Gershkovich remains in pre-trial detention until at least November, and Western journalists continue to leave the country.

There are some visible signs of economic distress. The ruble has fallen to all-time lows, falling past the 100 rubles per dollar threshold that carries a particular psychological importance for Russian consumers. A weaker currency is likely to fuel inflation by making imports more expensive. Russia’s economy is also facing supply chain issues, along with labor shortages, in large part given the mass exodus of IT specialists and engineers. Sberbank CEO Herman Gref said that Russia is grappling with a severe shortage of IT specialists of around one million people, a problem that will likely persist over the next few years. The weak ruble also makes Russia a less attractive market for its migrant workers, hurting other sectors of Russia’s economy.

Ordinary Russians still are not feeling the pinch of sanctions. According to Chicago Council and Levada polling, 80 percent of Russians said that sanctions have not created big problems for them. Most Russians report—consistent with Kremlin narratives—that the sanctions are designed to weaken and humiliate Russia.

Russia’s draft budget also lays out increases for social support, which are intended to shore up the regime’s popularity ahead of the presidential election in March 2024. It remains unclear, however, how Moscow will raise the funds for projected increases in spending (defense spending will increase to nearly 6 percent of GDP, up from 3.9 percent this year and 2.7 percent in 2021). Moscow’s financial compensation to the families of relatives killed in the war will also likely support the Putin regime’s stability.

There continue to be rumors that Russia will launch another major mobilization campaign in the coming months, which would test the restrictions that the Duma implemented to tamp down on those Russians leaving the country to avoid being drafted. Many analysts believe the Kremlin will try to defer any such mobilization until after the March 2024 presidential elections.

Meanwhile, many Russians who fled in the aftermath of the invasion and the mass mobilization in fall 2022 are experiencing financial and other challenges that are forcing them to return, and Putin is encouraging them to do so (although signals from others in the regime are contradictory, as Duma Speaker Vyacheslav Volodin recently threatened returning war opponents with exile to Magadan). Some European countries, for example, are making increasingly clear that they are not universally welcome. The Baltic states are making it difficult for Russians to visit or live there and, in some cases, won’t admit cars with Russian license plates.

Anti-war Russians abroad have also expressed concerns that the Kremlin is covertly pressuring host countries to send them back to Russia. Although the Kremlin will use repression to keep such groups in check, the return of these Russians can contribute to pockets of discontent that could be catalyzed by a triggering event.

To the extent that polls on Russian public opinion are reliable, polls since February 2023 suggest that Putin’s approval ratings stand at or over 80 percent (on par with the December 2022 polls). For a significant portion of the public, Prigozhin's death was a well-deserved outcome. Even those who sympathized with him largely condemned the mutiny, believing it weakened the regime during wartime.

The Kremlin promoting political apathy has become a thing of the past, and there is greater pressure for public displays of support for the regime. The Kremlin held a large rally for young people in Red Square to celebrate the incorporation of the four annexed Ukrainian territories a year ago. Military education is being reintroduced in schools, and the Russian people are continually being fed the message that this is an existential fight with the West, which wants to destroy Russia—a message that resonates with the average Russian.

Repression inside Russia continues to rise. The Kremlin has cracked down on both ends of its opposition—the liberals and the pro-war, ultra-nationalists. In July, the Kremlin arrested Igor Girkin, an ultra-nationalist who had been highly critical of the Kremlin but who the Kremlin had previously allowed to voice dissent. On the other end of the spectrum, Kremlin critic Vladimir Kara-Murza is now in a Siberian maximum security penal colony normally reserved for hardened criminals. Alexei Navalny is in solitary confinement in a harsh penal colony.

The crackdown on civil society also continues. In July, Putin signed into law a bill expanding the definition of so-called foreign agents, making it even easier for the state to target its domestic critics. The Kremlin raided the homes of activists from Golos and opened a criminal investigation against the co-chair of the election-monitoring group.

The riots and angry mobs at the Makhachkala airport in Dagestan, however, highlight a potential regime vulnerability—an inability of the security services to act in the absence of instruction from the top. Putin himself seems hesitant in responding to challenging situations, which paralyzes the regime as security officials do nothing absent clear direction for fear that doing so could jeopardize their jobs. An inability of the regime to promptly react to challenges raises the risk that relatively small challenges could spiral into something larger.